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This opinion article describes and analyses some of the consequences of the ever-growing stringency
of regulatory standards in the field of drugs and vaccines for human health, with distinct issues in the
developed and developing countries. It is argued that the cost and benefit of safety standards, prior
and after implementation, are not sufficiently evaluated, nor sufficiently informed by science. We
suspect that, as a result, significant amounts of public and private money might be misspent,
because assessments of risks/benefits are often questionable, sometimes out of context and
inadequate. It is suggested that, just as it happened in medicine 30 years ago, a move towards
Evidence-Based Regulation should be promoted. Given the probable and predictable negative
impacts on costs and innovation, both in developed and developing countries—particularly in the
latter where the needs are huge and the resources highly limited—we contend that such a move is
urgently needed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many human activities that have a social impact are regulated. In
the production of goods and services, standards and guidelines
often frame current and future activities. For example, a new
manufacturing plant will be built and operated according to a
number of rules that are set in advance. These rules usually, but
not always, apply retroactively. They are often devised to cope
with new situations, setting a link between regulatory standards
and innovation. An important subset of regulatory standards
deals with safety. Safety is a major and growing public concern.
The stringency of safety standards has increased continuously
during the last decades. In several western countries, the
precautionary principle—by which precaution should be
exercised, even in the absence of a complete scientific
demonstration of the risk—has become a major driver of this
phenomenon (Kourilsky and Viney, 1999). The precautionary
principle has given rise to numerous controversies, but has
actually penetrated the field of health (Goldstein, 2001, Kriebel
and Tickner, 2001; Melton, 2000). Martuzzi (2007) has underlined
the consequences of article 174 of the Amsterdam Treaty of the
European Union, which stipulates that “Community policy on the
environment [. . ] shall be based on the precautionary principle”:
European law, at its highest level, is explicit and
uncompromising. As promotion and protection of human health
is one of the key motivations of environmental preservation, this
provision also involves public health. Currently, many safety
standards are applied to a great variety of objects (cars, toys, etc.
) and processes. Safety is one of the regalian rights of any nation.
There is a clear link between national regulatory policies,
especially safety standards, and international trade. For
example, when a nation bans a particular class of toys that do
not meet certain standards, it, obviously, also refuses to import
such toys from another country. 
In this opinion paper, we analyze a number of issues associated
with regulatory standards involved in the design and
manufacturing of drugs and vaccines for human health. This area
is particularly important and sensitive. It has been imprinted by
major sanitary crises, such as those involving Hepatitis B, HIV or
Creutzfeld-Jacobs contaminations and the “mad cow” episode. In
addition, there is a huge gap between the sanitary situation of
developed and developing countries where many of the so-called
neglected diseases have remained unaddressed. Are current
regulatory standards adapted to solve health problems in the
North and the South? It will be argued here that, as essential and
necessary as they are, some features of regulatory standards may
and should be challenged; that there are major questions about
their internationalization; and that, by and large, their
implementation is not sufficiently based on science. 
We concluded that there is an urgent need to develop more
scientific activities in the field of regulation. We coin the term of
Evidence-Based Regulation and propose to promote the concept,
much in the same way as Evidence-Based Medicine was
promoted some thirty years ago (reviewed in Sackett et al., 1996). 
2. THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE MAJOR
FORESEEABLE ISSUES IN THE NORTH. 
Most developed countries have created sufficiently autonomous
and empowered regulatory bodies to judge and act independently
of political and economical pressures. The USA paved the way by
creating the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1905.
European countries followed individually and the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)1 was
created in 1995 (Abraham and Lewis 2001). Most of these
regulatory bodies are organized in a similar way, with similar
power. They independently fix the standards driving research,
development and manufacturing of drugs and vaccines. These
standards are usually comparable between countries, otherwise
drugs could not be importable from one country to another. For
instance, FDA has the right to inspect a manufacturing plant in
France and to monitor the quality of the products devoted to the
US market. Note that even if a product is manufactured in a given
country according to the appropriate standards, it is not usually
exportable, unless it has been registered specifically in that
country. Registration is a lengthy and expensive process and can
last for one, two years or even more, since it includes a thorough
verification of all R&D and manufacturing aspects, and often
involves additional clinical trials made in the country. Regulatory
agencies are powerful enough to close down a manufacturing
plant if compliance is defective. 
2.1. THE RAISE IN REGULATORY STANDARDS
It is not surprising that regulatory standards are rising constantly.
As technology improves, requirements increase. For example, a
better analytical method improves sensitivity and allows the
detection of new impurities. It is to be expected that a regulatory
body will request these compounds to be characterized, proven
safe, and/or eliminated. Similarly, automates are now judged less
prone to error than humans, and regulatory bodies will logically
recommend or impose automated manufacturing plants, etc. 
In addition, several sanitary crises in the last 50 years—such as
Thalidomide in 1962, the infected blood scandal in 1985 and the
recent Vioxx case (Bresalier et al., 2005, Kerr et al., 2007)—have
aroused a major pressure from the public and the media, such
that the public authorities have strived to increase sanitary safety. 
The very concept of “risk” has changed, with the spread of the
“precautionary principle”. The latter was initially developed as a
frame to deal with long-term environmental issues (sea pollution,
ozone depletion in the atmosphere, etc. ) but it became quickly
part of the sanitary framework, especially in Europe, and it is
gradually entering the law since (Kourilsky and Viney, 1999). The
term is less popular in other parts of the world, but the concept of
precaution has gained grounds everywhere. 
Finally, a number of major law suits have increased even more the
sensitivity of safety issues. In several cases, drug companies have
been sentenced to pay compensations which are considerable
1 www.emea.europa.eu
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enough to threaten their existence. This trend is facilitated by legal
mechanisms such as the class actions in the US. In France, a
Prime minister was driven to High Court, and then cleared, in the
infected blood case. In general, it may be suspected that drug
companies will often fear for their revenues and their image, while
public officials in charge may choose to be exceedingly cautious.
As independent as they are, regulatory agencies cannot remain
insensitive to the weight of public opinion. 
All these factors concur to increase the stringency of regulatory
standards, which raises a number of questions. We choose here to
discuss the four following ones. First, is the risks/benefits balance
properly evaluated? Second, are the costs adequate to the social
benefits? Third, what is the impact on innovation? And fourth, is
the inter-dependency of the national systems in the international
network of the North properly managed? 
2.2. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RAISE 
OF REGULATORY STANDARDS IN THE NORTH
2.2.1. IS THE RISKS/BENEFITS BALANCE 
PROPERLY EVALUATED?
An optimal risks/benefits balance is supposingly the best trade-
off between efficiency of a drug and safety for the patient(s) in a
certain context (most often national). The case of preventative
vaccines is somewhat distinct from that of drugs since millions of
healthy individuals, often children, are to be vaccinated. Several
observations suggest that the “risk” factor has increased recently. 
From 1975 to 1995, the number of surveys required to obtain an
approval from regulatory agencies, has doubled and the number
of patients included in clinical trials has tripled. Remarkably,
phase III vaccine clinical trials involving more than 50. 000
volunteers are not uncommon anymore (Vesikari et al., 2006). The
mere volume of documents needed for registration has
considerably inflated. 10-15 years ago, the paper documentation
needed for the registration of a single vaccine required a small
truck to be delivered to the health authorities. Today, it is not
longer the case, not because procedures are easier but because
files are sent electronically. 
A significant fraction of this inflation relates to safety. The exact
part may be difficult to assess. For example, increasing the size of
vaccine phase III clinical trials does not serve the sole purpose of
improving the precision of the efficacy measurement. It also aims
to permit a more extensive assessment of potential adverse
effects, which were previously evaluated by pharmacovigilance
(sometimes called phase IV) after the launch of the product.
Whether too much weight is given to safety is a matter of
appreciation. Nevertheless, the Vioxx and other recent cases
suggest to us that this question is worth being debated. 
Commercialized since 1999, this anti-inflammatory was retrieved
by Merck on a public announcement on September 28th, 2004. The
company took this decision (not requested by the FDA) when a
clinical trial on long-term effects of the molecule for colon cancer
patients revealed an abnormally high death rate from
cardiovascular problems among patients taking the medicine for
more than 18 months (Bresalier et al., 2005 ; Kerr et al., 2007). 
As the vice president of the French Market Authorization
Committee Pr Bergman stated:
“supporters of the precautionary principle inside the
company preferred to avoid 3 infarcts, even if it led to 8
digestive bleeding”. 
Beyond a really complex assessment of the benefit/risk ratio, one
may find paradoxical to retrieve a class of drugs thoroughly
evaluated with modern procedures, and leave on the market old
medicines for which nobody dared to run such trials. 
Was it a good choice in terms of public health? Did Merck consider
that the drug was not profitable enough with respect to the risk?
We will never know if the priority given to cardiovascular risk was
thoughtfully motivated, but the media storm was fruitless. In the
end, after 3 days of debates, experts from the FDA recommended
the comeback of the product, which was obviously impossible. The
controversy was further complicated by statements implying that
the clinical files had not been properly delivered by the drug
company to the FDA (DeAngelis and Fontanarosa, 2008; Psaty and
Kronmal, 2008; Ross et al. 2008). 
In our opinion, the Vioxx crisis was largely related to the
incomprehension of the public faced to a complex assessment,
but also to the obsession of the precautionary principle. The latter
brings people to think that any secondary effect should have been
prevented (Strom, 2006). Indeed, the expectation of a zero-risk is
totally illusory and prejudicial to the pursuit of therapeutic
innovation: in medicine, taking no risk means doing nothing. The
Institute of Medicine (IOM) was asked by the FDA to analyze the
case, and concluded that the Agency should strengthen the US
drug safety system further2—a recommendation which faces
some practical issues (Wadman, 2007). 
2.2.2. ARE THE INCREASED COSTS ADEQUATE?
The raise of regulatory standards has a cost, both in time and
investment. The time factor is often underestimated. More
complex and heavy procedures may involve significant delays in
the public release of the drug or the vaccine. In addition, the
registration processes which operate nationally and
internationally can be quite time-consuming. Some of the induced
delays have been alleviated by electronic filing. Regulatory
standards can also cause significant delays in R&D. It has to be
appreciated that during that time, individuals that might have
cured or whose disease could have been prevented may become
sick and die. In 2003, an association of cancer patients brought an
action against the FDA on this basis (Basu 2003). More recently,
FDA has been challenged for delaying a therapeutic vaccine
against prostate cancer (cf. Froese 2008)3. 
2 Editorial: Reforms on drug safety, Nature, (2006). 443, 372, (anonymous).
3 Editorial: The regulator disapproves, Nature Biotechnology (2008)., Vol 26 (anonymous).
account for the increase (Bains, 2004; Amir-Aslani, 2006). Whether
the raise of regulatory standards is, or not, involved is unknown. 
Once on the market, a number of drugs fail. Premarketing studies
are necessarily limited in time and study participants are often
different from “real-life” patients. 51% of drugs are subject to
label change because of safety issues discovered after marketing
and 3-4% of drugs are withdrawn for safety reasons (Lasser et al.,
2002). The costs of post marketing surveillance are significant.
Changes and failures impact the R&D expenditures. Some argue
that large drug companies could better manage their R&D
pipeline (Bains, 2004). 
Pharmaceutical companies devote some 15% or more of their
total budget to R&D. This figure is unlikely to grow much. At the
same time, their financial (market) value relies on their R&D
pipeline to a significant extent, with a degree of uncertainty which
increases with risks and costs. It is thus likely that the growth of
R&D costs is not sustainable for pharmaceutical companies in the
long term. We believe that the interest of the patients is to rely on
an innovative and stable industry rather than on a fragile and
unstable innovating private sector of too high cost. 
How much has safety increased over, say, the last two decades,
and at which cost? In our view, safety has indeed improved, but
was already quite high twenty years ago (as documented by Strom,
2006). But R&D expenses have gone up enormously. Again, if part
of the increase is due to safety, the risk benefit balance needs to
be assessed. In the worst case scenario, it may be that a
significant part of R&D expenses is misspent and even wasted.
Actually, the progress in safety and the associated costs could be
better documented. 
2.2.4. INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN DEVELOPED NATIONS?
While the national systems converge, they are not identical.
Appreciations on safety issues may vary. Moreover, a decision
made in one country may significantly affect another. A striking
example is the auto-centered assessment of risk on the
influenza vaccine in the UK, which could have created a sanitary
crisis in the USA. 
During summer 2004, the British subsidiary of the Chiron
Company informed the authorities that it had a sterility
problem on a batch of flu vaccine (Fluvirin). In October,
after an inspection from the British MHRA, the production
of the vaccine in the Liverpool factory was suspended and
exportations were forbidden. This factory supplied less
than 20% of the British demand, but almost half of the US
one (48 million doses out of the 100 million required). It
was already too late for the Americans to contract
another factory since all of them were already at full
capacity. The decision created a significant shortage of flu
vaccine in the USA, where the influenza is a serious
disease and causes an average of about 30,000 deaths
each year (Thompson et al., 2003). 
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The issue of the financial cost can be raised about R&D. In
Industry R&D costs have increased about 3 to 5 folds in 20 years.
A recent study used by the FDA in its report “Innovation or
stagnation: challenge and opportunity on the critical path to new
medical products” evidenced a sharp increase of R&D costs lately,
and valued the financial endeavor required to bring a new
molecule on the market up to 1.7 billion dollars (Gilbert et al.,
2003) (other estimates are discussed below). Indeed, new drugs
are more and more expensive. Some of the new anti-cancer drugs
reach unprecedented prices, which make them either hardly
accessible to anyone, even in the developed countries and / or
more and more difficult to be compensated for by social security
and health insurance systems. 
How much of the increase in R&D cost is due to the raise in
regulatory standards? We could not find data which would allow us
to answer this question. We suspect that such data are actually
largely missing, implying that the costs and benefits of regulatory
standards are not sufficiently evaluated. We are not aware of
systematic a priori evaluations of the costs and benefits of a new
regulation or a systematic follow-up and evaluation of the
established ones, neither by regulatory agencies nor by other public
authorities, or by other academic and private bodies. No doubt that
these evaluations are difficult to perform for a variety of technical,
methodological, social and systemic reasons. No doubt as well that
they are of importance for regulators, public authorities,
consumers and citizens. This is one of the reasons why, as
discussed in the end, we plea for Evidence-Based Regulation. 
2.2.3. WHAT IS THE IMPACT ON INNOVATION?
Surprisingly, despite the remarkable advances of life sciences, the
number of new drugs approved each year has not increased in the
last 10-15 years. It looks as if the innovation gap goes wider and
wider. May be the easy drugs have been found. May be we need a
few better drugs rather than many new ones. Nevertheless, while
the development of new medicines has always been a risky
venture, it appears that the risk of failure has been skyrocketing
lately. According to the same survey from the FDA only 8% of drugs
entering Phase I will get to the market. This rate was close to 14%
during the previous periods. A variety of reasons, including the very
model of R&D project flow within the large companies, may
Figure 1: R&D costs for a New Chemical Entity
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Rapidly, the CDC reserved the available doses of vaccine
(produced by another company) for populations at risk: elderly,
newborns and patients suffering from chronic diseases, that is to
say 45 million people (Longini and Halloran, 2005). The
Department of Heath and Human Services (DHHS) tried by all
means to find additional doses, even in foreign countries. But
other vaccines, for example from Canada, did not have the FDA
approval and could not get it before the winter vaccination
campaign. In the end, the US authorities managed to get 
61 million doses, partly due to the huge efforts of Sanofi-Pasteur
(Zambon, 2004). 
Julie Gerberding, director of the CDC, announced to the US House
of Representatives: “we are fortunate that the flu season had been
relatively moderate so far this year”… What is striking is the
absence of global assessment of consequences on public health
(Glezen, 2006). While this is no excuse for the manufacturing
defects of Chiron, nothing was written about a direct
contamination of the vaccines lots. The closing of the factory was
mostly a decision of precaution. Since the shortage impacted the
USA more than the UK, one may wonder whether the authorities
felt less concerned by the risk of increased mortality. On the other
side, the rigidity of the FDA procedures is disputable: why banning
importation of safe vaccines—suitable for Canadians and
Europeans—in case of a shortage? 
From this experience, the U. S. Department of Health and Human
Services learned how to deal with seasonal influenza vaccine and
how to redefine the pre-pandemic objectives. Currently licensed
vaccines are produced in specialized chicken eggs with a technique
that has barely changed in 50 years. The HHS Secretary awards
recently more than 1 billion$ to 5 companies to develop cell-based
influenza vaccine, which holds the promise of reliable, flexible and
scalable method of producing influenza vaccines (www. hhs. gov).
Two contracts announced in July 2007, will provide funding for
renovation and expansion of existing facilities to increase domestic
vaccine manufacturing capacity. In July 2007, Sanofi-Pasteur has
also doubled its production capacity in the U. S. 
This example illustrates the point that a global assessment of
benefits and risks may be important even for a local decision. It also
suggests that too much precaution may induce large sanitary risks. 
3. THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE MAJOR
FORESEEABLE ISSUES IN THE SOUTH
Rich countries fare better and better, while health keeps
worsening in many developing countries. So far, every year, 
13 millions people die from AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and
enteric diseases, while 3 to 5 million deaths caused by infectious
diseases could be prevented by the use of existing vaccines, some
of which cost only a few cents (Gwatkin et al., 1999). The turn of the
millennium was meant by the United Nations to set a milestone
towards worldwide wealth and global growth benefiting everyone.
The United Nations launched bold projects—the Global Compact,
the Millennium Objectives to name a few. The richest countries—
at that time gathered in the G7—acknowledged for the first time at
their Summit in Okinawa in 2000 that reducing wealth inequalities
between countries should be on their agenda. Growing activism—
through initiatives such as “Make Poverty History” or the Porto
Alegre Forum—helped prompt a public debate on how the richer
bear responsibility to help the poorer4. 
3.2. NEGLECTED DISEASES 
Along with extreme poverty, the developing countries are also
plagued with groundbreaking morbidity levels. Some of it can be
blamed on food or water related issues, or wars or political
instability. But there is also a long forgotten mass killer: the so-
called neglected diseases. Mostly infectious, they account for 90%
of worldwide morbidity and at least 1 billion people—one sixth of
the world’s population—suffer from one or more of these diseases
(WHO World Health Report 2007). And yet, only 1% of the 1,400
new drugs, which have reached the market in the last 25 years,
were devoted to these diseases (www. dndi. org). In the
meanwhile, worldwide R&D funding has increased at least 3 or 5
fold, showing that the highly restricted allocation of resources to
R&D on neglected diseases originates from a structural problem
rather than from the shortage of money per se. Many much
needed treatments, vaccines and drugs are either non-existent or
inadequate, primarily because there is no international market to
drive their development. These diseases are not common in rich
countries and their victims, almost exclusively in developing
countries, are too poor to afford the treatments (Mathers and
Loncar, 2006). The situation is exacerbated by insufficient
healthcare infrastructure, and too often with political instability. 
A fundamental issue is the lack of effective demand on the
market. From the pharmaceutical companies’ side, going on those
markets would mean major investments and price reductions,
with little chance of return (at least short term). Without
incentives, worldwide companies hardly enter those markets. On
these issues, industrials have often been systematically
demonized. The AIDS crisis has shown how important it is that
they adjust their intellectual property management in order to
enable local manufacturers to supply those markets. However,
their role is not to ensure public health all around the world and
multinational companies have to abide by largely deregulated
market laws5. 
The problem is that patients are too poor (Victora et al., 2003) to
pay for expensive drugs, which is what pharmaceutical
companies do best. In fact, modern treatments and diagnostics
can be expensive at three levels: the products, the devices
required to use them (electronic instrumentation, etc) and the
required staff. These three levels are interactive. Trained medical
staff is cheaper in developing countries, but also painfully scarce.
Therefore, to be helpful against neglected diseases, a product has
to be cheap, and easy to use—ideally simple enough so that non-
medical people can be taught to use it with a crash course.
Products designed and manufactured in the North do not usually
meet these requirements. 
4 www.portoalegre2002.org and www.makepovertyhistory.org
5 www.dndi.org
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Thus, the market is not an adequate determinant of value for
neglected diseases: alone, it fails to stimulate the development
and supply of theses goods, or their adaptation to the
circumstances of developing countries. Vaccines, for example, are
themselves a ‘neglected’ part of medicines (3% of the worldwide
drug market). The existing ones (such as measles) are not
sufficiently used in the South, not only because of their cost, but
also because of specific implementation problems (needles, cold
chain etc.) and of the weakness of local health systems. As for
entirely new vaccines directed against diseases absent in the
North, there is not market to drive their development. 
To be more specific about R&D, research is largely market
independent because many academic institutions, even though they
have to comply with their funding bodies, have some freedom to
search in areas that have no obvious or short term economic
potential. On the contrary, development is largely market
dependent. And development costs are usually far superior to
research costs and out of reach for most academic institutions, as
one will realize by comparing the figure of about 1 billion per new
chemical entity to the yearly budget of most research institutes,
which is often much lower. Therefore, research is neglected to some
extent, but the critical point is development: research on neglected
diseases, even if successful, will not, in general, be developed. 
As a consequence, when patients are poor, there is no
mechanism to finance the R&D that could bring about new
medicines for the neglected diseases. Fortunately, a recent burst
of philanthropic donations—illustrated by the Gates foundation
and others—as well as new international types of partnerships
have significantly improved the situation, but have not yet solved
the overall problem. The question addressed below is that of the
adequacy of Northern regulations to drug and vaccine
development in the South. 
3.3. THE IMPACT OF NORTHERN REGULATORY STANDARDS. 
3.3.1. PRODUCTS FROM THE NORTH HAVE 
AN INADEQUATE COST STRUCTURE FOR THE SOUTH. 
The price of the products incorporates the increasing impact that
regulation is likely to have on development costs, and
manufacturing is largely done in rich regions. Drug development
is the costliest step to create a new drug. Setting-up wide-scale
clinical trials is very complicated in developing countries. The
legal framework that regulates drug environment and trials is
clearly universal, but its practical application finds no equivalent in
those deprived regions. Merely replicating American and
European rules is obviously problematic as they are not meant to
fit with situations encountered in the South. 
Thus, the cost structure of medicine—even for neglected diseases
prevalent only in the South—is so far mostly modeled by the
North. Some emerging countries manage to cope with the
situation but developing countries suffer from this inadequate cost
structure when paying for health products coming from the North. 
3.3.2. REGULATORY STANDARDS PROVIDE AN EFFICIENT
PROTECTIONIST BARRIER FROM SOUTH TO NORTH:
The cost and sophistication of the manufacturing of medicines, in
part due to the regulatory standards, is such that developing
countries cannot, at this stage, make products and export them to
the North. This is also a matter of dynamics. Regulatory standards
change, and developing countries cannot afford to follow that race,
or to match the investments needed to register in the developed
countries. Thus, drugs sold in the North are so far solely made in the
North, and regulatory standards can act as a protectionist barrier. 
3.3.3. REGULATORY STANDARDS FROM THE NORTH 
MAY INTERFERE WITH MAKING PRODUCTS IN 
THE SOUTH FOR THE SOUTH:
One of the most complicated and possibly perverse consequences
of the internationalization of Northern standards is that poor
countries that fail to meet them, refrain from manufacturing for
themselves, even if they are not formally forbidden to. Thus, even
when the local risks / benefit balance is favorable, the local
authorities, sometimes under the pressure of international
organizations, many choose to endorse Northern standards.
Understandably, how could health decision makers accept
vaccines or drugs to be distributed in their own countries while
considered too risky for people from the rich countries?
This question relates to the hotly debated issue of the “double
standard” that needs to be approached and discussed carefully. 
There are two major arguments to promote the interna tionalization
of unique regulatory standards. The first is that the best standards
should be used by everyone such that everyone benefits from the
best products and healthcare conditions. Reciprocally, it is judged
unethical that poor people would access health products of a lower
quality that those available to the rich. The second argument is
economic in nature and relates to trade and free circulation of
goods. Poverty is so acute in certain countries of the South that, as
mentioned above, these issues may seem somewhat farfetched.
However, the situation in emerging countries such as Brazil, China,
Cuba and India deserves being further analyzed, because drug
industries close to meet, or meeting, the Northern regulatory
standards are growing there. Whether drugs manufactured by
Brazilian or Chinese companies will freely flow on the American
and European market remains to be seen. 
Dealing with the ethical issue, two major questions come to mind:
who decides what is best for the others? And the second one is: on
which criteria? 
3.4. SINGLE, DOUBLE OR MULTIPLE REGULATORY STANDARDS?
3.4.1. THE ROTAVIRUS VACCINE CASE:
Rotavirus diarrheas affect around 130 million children every year.
Despite a treatment based on oral rehydration, these diseases are
a major cause of infant mortality in developing countries, causing
around 500,000-800,000 deaths each year (Miller and Mc Cann,
2000, Simonsen et al., 2001), killing one child in 40 during the first
5 years of life (Melton, 2000). In the US, rotaviruses are responsible
of more than 3 million diarrheas each winter with 500,000
consultations and from 55,000 to 100,000 hospitalizations.
However, and fortunately, only 20 to 100 patients die each year
(Tucker et al., 1998). Rotaviruses are responsible of half of
gastrointestinal diseases, and the improvement of hygiene is not
sufficient to eradicate these epidemics, making vaccination
desirable even in rich countries. 
An efficient vaccine was first commercialized in August 1998 by
Wyeth laboratories (Joensuu et al., 1997). The Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended that every child be
vaccinated with 3 injections at the age of 2, 4 and 6 months (CDC,
1999). A survey from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) had
shown that rotavirus infections costed over 1 billion dollars to the
US administration each year. The vaccination campaign was judged
cost effective. This vaccine was a commercial success with 
1.5 million doses administered the first year (Melton, 2000).
However, after a few months of vaccination, the CDC noticed an
increase in the number of intestinal invaginations (or
intussusceptions) (CDC, 1999b). A small number of patients
suffered from this severe secondary effect. An article form experts
of the National Immunization Program and the CDC estimated that
“assuming a full implementation of a national program of
vaccination, 1 case of intussusception attributable to the vaccine
would occur for every 4,670 to 9,474 infants vaccinated”. In October
1999, the ACIP retrieved its recommendation (CDC, 1999c) and
commercialization of the vaccine was stopped. 
This vaccine no longer had a future in the USA. But as a
consequence, the development of this product in countries
where it was needed most was suspended. In Africa, Asia and
South America, rotaviruses kill 2,000 children each day. Clearly
their risk assessment is totally different: for some populations,
the benefit of being vaccinated largely out passes the risk of a
severe but rare intestinal invagination (Melton, 2000). And yet,
how could they accept a product that was not good enough for
the Americans? But is it ethical not to use a vaccine that could
save millions of lives in developing countries? Those questions
were raised at a WHO conference in 2000, where the
representation of most deprived countries was symbolic (only
Tunisia and South Africa were representing the whole African
continent). During this conference (WHO, 2000), the CDC
representative clearly stated that the ACIP recommendation
was for the USA only, and argued in favor of an early
vaccination in developing countries. What is more,
epidemiological studies had proven that intestinal
invaginations are less prevalent in poor countries. However,
WHO concluded to wait for a new vaccine, in spite of the fact
that a new product developed by different pharmaceutical
companies and tested both in developing and developed
countries, could not be expected before 5 to 7 year. It has been
noted by a physician-ethicist (Wejner, 2000): “some have falsely
assumed that inaction is a morally neutral state. But if one is
culpable of vaccine related deaths, then one is also culpable for
deaths caused by withholding the vaccine”. 
The sad and ironical part of this story is that further studies proved
that the withdrawal in the US was not justified, because the risk of
intestinal invagination was smaller than suggested by the initial
studies (Murphy et al., 2001, Murphy et al., 2003). The NIH even
proved that the hospitalization rate for invaginations had decreased
in the long run in states where the vaccination had been widespread
(Kramarz et al., 2001, and Simonsen et al., 2001). In fact the vaccine
triggered earlier an intussusception on patients that would have
had this problem eventually. In the end, the benefit/risk balance was
still positive (Glass, 2004). But it was impossible for the US
authorities to step back since it could have aroused a wave of
mistrust around vaccination in general. And, even if the decision of
withdrawal was too fast, it was a rational process in the context of
the US, because rotavirus diarrheas are a benign and curable
disease there. The problem is that this decision was taken in order
to avoid a political risk and media incomprehension, but it was not
fully scientifically based and motivated. In addition, the local
authorities did not assess the damage that this withdrawal could
cause on worldwide sanitary conditions. Arguably, this may have
been out of their scope, but it was in the mandate of WHO to check
and exploit constructively the situation. 
We have stated previously and elsewhere that the precautionary
principle may be counterproductive when used hastily, and that it
may even go against prevention. The rotavirus case can be
interpreted to mean that the rare complications provoked by a
vaccine in rich countries were given, even by WHO, more
importance than many lives to be saved in poor countries. 
3.4.2. THE CASE FOR MULTIPLE STANDARDS
With the above example, we cannot escape the question of
whether we, in the North, are, consciously or not, exporting our
vision and our standards to the South in a somewhat imperialistic
fashion. After all, nations have the right to decide for themselves.
The argument that many developing countries do not have
appropriately trained staff to properly analyze the local situation
and make educated decisions is less and less valid. Assuming it is,
one could then argue that the highest priority—and somehow the
role of WHO—would be to train people to help making the
decisions, rather than making decisions in their place. 
The other major issue deals with the criteria used to set the
regulatory standards themselves. If their goal is indeed to define
the proper risks and benefits balance for the local population, two
factors come to light. One is factual: risks are obviously not the
same nor of the same magnitude everywhere. The other is
cultural: the perception of risk through secondary effects is
largely dependent on the sanitary, social and cultural context of
the region. For example, they are less accepted for new drugs, or
for preventive care. Of course, in the poorest countries, where life
expectancy often does not exceed 40 years, the perception of risks
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is completely different. Thus, there is a strong logic basis to favor
“multiple” standards, each adapted to a defined context. 
3.4.3. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM
Regulatory standards are designed to protect the safety of people,
and are thus closely intertwined with ethical issues. Supporters of
the universality of ethics oppose those in favor of ethics adapted to
local situations (contextual ethics). The former mix up ethical
standards with regulatory standards, and accuse the latter of
“double standards”. We agree that reaching the same standards
for every one is probably ideal, but the problem is that this ideal,
which every single country—either rich or poor—should tend
towards, is being currently implemented at the poor’s’ expenses.
While developing countries cannot accept medicines that were not
good enough for rich patients (it would mean that their lives worth
less because they are poor), rich countries, when establishing
their standards, should then take into account their impact on
millions of lives in remote areas. 
Another problem is that the seemingly obvious statement that
“safer is better”, which superficially can be taken as an implicitly
ethical principle, is not as obvious as it looks. Actually, the
rotavirus example shows that it is not necessarily ethical when
faced with its practical consequences (Kourilsky, 2004). 
In the end, the resolution of the sterile and dangerous battle
between the proponents of universal and contextual ethics might
rely on the definition of what is unethical rather than on the
opposite. It is clearly unacceptable to provide poor people with
drugs and vaccines of insufficient quality. But is it unethical, if so
they wish, to provide them with medicines which were extensively
used in the North, 20 or 30 years ago, with huge benefits for public
health, and few, if any, adverse effects, and are, nevertheless,
outdated in the North, because the regulatory standards have
changed? We are again at the heart of the matter. How is the
validity of the regulatory standards assessed? How are
risk/benefit ratios evaluated? And who decides?
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. REGULATORY STANDARDS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY EVALUATED
Regulatory standards are indeed essential, inescapable and
enormously useful, especially in the field of human health where
safety is a major and legitimate concern. This does not imply that
they should be immune to evaluation. The actual benefits
produced by those regulations have to be assessed, and compared
to the costs they may induce before and after their
implementation. Certain standards might be reconsidered in view
of individual and collective benefits, and at the light of what really
happens on the field. 
Regulatory standards are constantly raised, while their cost and
impact are not systematically evaluated. In our view, it is highly
significant that we could not find much solid data on the rational
implementation and evaluation of regulatory standards. This
situation has major consequences:
It leads to suspect that some regulatory standards may simply be
useless. If such is the case, the associated costs are unjustified.
This is hardly acceptable, especially when dealing with medicines
devoted to the poor countries. 
It makes it difficult to properly assess the risks/benefits
balances, in situations where they are the basis of major public
health decisions. 
It favors globalized views and, sometimes, theoretical or
ideologically biased ones, by lack of analytical capacity. 
In the absence of more data, we cannot estimate the magnitude of
the extra-costs which might be induced by undue regulatory
standards. Given the huge increase in R&D costs in the North, we
suspect that they may be high. We are thus led to raise the
provocative question of whether significant amounts of moneys
are spent in processes of unproven usefulness. In the North, the
consumers finally endorse the extra-costs, but social protection
systems getting close to asphyxia, and this issue deserves being
carefully analyzed. In the South, much of the health improvements
are supported by charitable funds in severely limited amounts. It
is somewhat shocking to suspect that part of this money is wasted
or misused. 
4.2. THE CASE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED REGULATION
From the above, we conclude that the regulatory field, at least in
the area of human health, which we looked at, is not instructed
enough by science. We contend that a situation in which decisions
are not sufficiently based upon facts and measures, nor followed
up by an objective evaluation, involves a non-scientific attitude. A
parallel can be drawn with medicine. In 1992, the term of
Evidence-Based Medicine was coined to promote a more rational
practice of medicine that had been advocated since the 70’s, in
particular by Cochrane (Sackett et al., 1996). In simple words, this
move intended to render medicine more scientific and less
empirical. Like medical doctors, regulators constitute a powerful
community of experts who hold and develop a specific body of
knowledge. We suggest that Evidence-Based Regulation should
be promoted with the same goals and spirit, as it was done in
medicine previously. 
It should be mentioned that the putative perimeter of Evidence-
Based Regulation is larger than that of the regulatory field per se,
and that it represents, in our view, a new area for scientific
research. A first point is that, just as science does not belong to the
scientists, regulations doe not belong to the regulators. More
precisely, Evidence-Based Regulation implies the gathering and
analysis of data which do not all pertain to the regulatory field. For
example, the estimation of the cost of development of a new drug
involves significant methodological questions, which go much
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beyond questionnaires sent out to companies, and rely on an
analysis of the R&D pathways in the latter (DiMasi et al. 2003;
Bains, 2004). Such estimates are needed to further dissect the cost
structure of new drugs and evaluate the induced cost of
regulations. Many other issues deserve being documented for the
purpose of evaluating risk benefit balances not only prior to, but
also after implementation of decisions. Some, especially those
dealing with the state of public health in the developed countries,
already are. Others, often in economics, are not. This is especially
true if one adopts a more holistic attitude, taking in account the
more global aspects of local decisions, in developed as well as
developing countries. 
Another aspect of Evidence-Based Regulation implies that the
community of regulators might make use of a number of rules and
procedures which have proven extremely useful in scientific
communities. They include peer-reviewed opened communication
systems which are currently somewhat lacking in the regulatory
field. The rationale is similar to the one which sustains the FACTS
initiative6. Finally, inherent to Evaluation Based Regulation is the
notion of including academic research. This is important in many
respects, especially since this research activity must be
independent by nature. In particular, information gathered from
industry must be validated. The process may face confidentially
issues. However, industry should not be, directly or indirectly in
the position of self-evaluation. 
We emphasize that promoting Evidence-Based Regulation
involves neither an attack upon regulators, nor a defense of
industry (or vice-versa), nor a incitement to decrease safety. The
overall goal behind the proposal is to have the field better
informed by science and, indeed, to make it more rigorous, while
possibly to achieve better public protection with less money. The
rise in costs might soon be unbearable. New methodologies for
clinic assessment, new ways to monitor drug safety (Strom, 2006),
and a new vision of preventive medicine probably need to be
designed and implemented. 
4.3. WHY EVIDENCE-BASED REGULATION 
IS URGENTLY NEEDED?
In prospective, the need is obvious and action is urgent. In the
North, the health expenses are climbing up, and will become less
and less affordable. In the South, every cent should be optimally
used to make progress, either in the distribution of existing drugs
and vaccines, or in the development of medicine to control
neglected diseases. In this respect, R&D figures provide an
illuminating example. If we take the usual (though questionable)
figure of 1 billion Euros to develop a new drug, it is hardly
conceivable to solve the issue of neglected diseases. Any factor
that diminishes this cost is a step forward resolution. 
We re-emphasize that challenging regulatory standards, as
we do here, does not imply in any way that scientific rigor is
relaxed. It is exactly the opposite. The fundamental question
is to do at least as well with less money. In this respect, it may
well be that the on-going efforts to solve the issue of
neglected diseases, with quite limited resources, will actually
help the North devising more appropriate rules for the
management of health. 
Finally, we consider that the ethical thinking would benefit from
being backed up by more data and that Evidence-Based
Regulation will help promoting more sophisticated and
sometimes better adapted ethical views. Hopefully, it might also
help developing the much needed solidarity which sometimes
seems to dwindle as wealth increases. 
Thanks to Marine Desbans for her help in analyzing information
and writing this manuscript.
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